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THE COST TO BE CLEAN
Kelsey E. Gagnon

Abstract
The last half-century has seen a push towards renewable energy
development, due to geopolitics, economics, and a growing concern over
the effects of climate change. The 1940s heralded the age of nuclear power
development. Regulators were quick to subsidize the new industry, and to
ensure the oversight was given to a single federal agency—the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC). Nuclear power was poised to provide
abundant, carbon-free electricity, but the industry has struggled in the last
few decades due to the stigma of nuclear accidents, cumbersome
bureaucracy, exorbitant expenses, and cheap energy alternatives like
natural gas. The race for a grid powered by nuclear energy has waned
while the renewable revolution is coming to full fruition. Specifically, the
development of offshore wind (OSW) power has seen a massive surge
around the world in the last decade. The U.S. is lagging behind other
countries in its quest for large commercial-scale OSW energy. The Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) is the federal regulatory body
responsible for OSW development in federal waters, but does not have the
level of authority of its nuclear counterpart, the NRC. In the current
climate, OSW has the advantage of being a relatively popular and
potentially viable large-scale electricity source. However, OSW faces
significant local opposition, and notable delays in the licensing process.
Cost, regulatory delays, and public opposition have dealt blows to both
the nuclear and wind energy industries. Nuclear power has the benefit of
time and lessons learned, and relatively centralized federal control, which
have helped in streamlining its licensing process—although the last twoand-a-half decades have seen the addition of only two new reactors to the
U.S. commercial industry. OSW, a relatively new sector in the power
industry, also has the benefit of nuclear power’s lessons learned. OSW can
potentially avoid nuclear power’s pitfalls by utilizing strong public
engagement programs addressing local concerns early in the process.
Furthermore, if Congress modelled BOEM’s regulatory structure after the
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NRC, giving BOEM more centralized power, and addressed significant
delays attributable to OSW’s environmental review process, coordination
between federal, state, and local entities could be improved, stabilizing
and expediting the leasing and permitting process. These measures could
ease the path for OSW development, boosting an important industry in the
fight against climate change. Renewable energy, OSW in particular, is
part of the solution to the climate crisis, and it requires public support,
favorable policy, and a clear regulatory path.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an era where state and local governments are attempting to hold
companies responsible for their role in climate change, the setting is ripe
for alternative, more sustainable energy resources to rise and meet the
challenge of providing for the increasing energy demands of the world.1
Climate change is driven by the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs),
mainly carbon dioxide.2 The presence of GHGs creates a “greenhouse
effect,” trapping solar radiation in the earth’s atmosphere and causing
global warming.3 The resulting effects of global warming are complex and
varied, challenging humans and ecosystems to adapt as temperatures rise
on land and in the sea, weather patterns shift, and the frequency of extreme
weather events increases.4 Energy use is the largest global and domestic
contributor to GHG emissions.5 Specifically, fossil fuel combustion,
mainly coal and natural gas, is the largest source of GHG emissions.6
This means that effectively combating global climate change
necessarily involves addressing energy sector emissions, and more
pointedly, developing economically viable alternatives to burning fossil
fuels. Renewable and sustainable energy sources such as wind, solar,
hydroelectric, tidal, biofuels, and nuclear, have much fewer (to zero)
associated GHG emissions. They remain cost prohibitive when compared
1

Ellen M. Gilmer, Can Climate ‘Test Cases’ Move Forward? It’s Up to Supreme Court,
BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-andenergy/can-climate-test-cases-move-forward-its-up-to-supremecourt?context=search&index=27 [https://perma.cc/Q7T7-WFD5].
2
DANIEL A. FARBER & CINNAMON CARLARNE, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 3-4 (Foundation
Press 1st ed. 2018).
3
Id.
4
Id. at 4-6.
5

(Approximately seventy percent of GHG emissions are due to electricity
generation, transportation, industry, or on-site heating and cooking fuels). Id. at
34.
6

Id. at 35.
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to relatively cheap electricity sources that are created through fossil fuels.
In an effort to make renewable energy competitive with fossil fuels, and
because of the threat that climate change poses to local economies and
public health, states have taken the lead in promoting renewable sources
for electricity generation.
Many states have created Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) that
require utility companies to purchase a certain percentage of electricity
from renewable sources. Recently, the Second and Seventh Circuits
upheld New York’s and Illinois’ Zero-Emission Credit (ZEC) programs
that require utilities to purchase ZECs generated by in-state nuclear power
facilities (zero-carbon emitters) at a price tied to the value of the carbon
dioxide-emissions reduction they provide.7
Nuclear power, although controversial and not without risk and
environmental impacts, was one of the first large-scale energy sources
which provided emissions-free electricity. The development of the selfsustaining nuclear reaction during the 1940s ushered in the nuclear age.8
While nuclear fission is most notably associated with the development of
atomic weapons, the U.S. (among other countries) understood the vast,
untapped energy potential in the nucleus of fissionable material.9 In
response, Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (the “AEA”)
(amended in 1954), allowing for the continued development of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes.10 In declaring that the “development, use,
and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote world
peace, improve the general welfare, increase the standard of living, and
strengthen free competition,” Congress was acknowledging not only the
great potential of nuclear fission, but also the need for comprehensive
regulation of this potentially devastating power.11 The Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), created by the AEA, was the original regulatory body
charged with promoting and controlling the development of nuclear
energy and material for peaceful civilian purposes.12 In the 1970s, the AEC
was divided into two separate bodies with separate regulatory functions:
the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), and the
7

See Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41(2nd Cir. 2018); Elec. Power
Supply Ass'n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018).
8

U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFF. OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, SCI. & TECH., THE
HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 7,
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/The%20History%20of%20Nuclear%20
Energy_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYA8-MVR4].
9

Id. at 1.
Id. at 7-8.
11
Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011(b) (1954).
12
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 8, at 8.
10
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), responsible for the regulation of
nuclear power facilities.13
Since its inception, nuclear energy has faced many obstacles,
including the ongoing issue of waste disposal, public fear and opposition,
and the high costs associated with construction, operation, and
decommissioning. Nuclear power has excelled in the areas of research and
development and helping to shape environmental law in the United
States.14 One of the biggest appeals of nuclear energy is that it produces
no GHGs, and at the time of this article nuclear power provided
approximately twenty percent of the U.S. electricity demand (with slightly
over sixty percent provided by fossil fuels, with the balance by
renewables).15
In contrast, while wind is a newer source of electric power generation,
wind power has long been harnessed to assist in tasks like pumping water
and grinding grain.16 Wind power technology spread around the world
over the centuries, eventually being employed to generate electricity in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.17 In response to the energy
crisis
of the 1970s, which put the spotlight on the U.S. dependency on fossil
fuels (specifically imported oil), Congress enacted the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). Among other provisions,
PURPA encouraged the development, research, and support of renewable
energy sources.18 Over the next few decades, wind technology, including
turbine design, efficiency measures, and environmental impact analysis,
was developed—with the first large-scale wind farm installed and
operated in California.19 One of the chief challenges that wind energy faces
today is the need to develop the technology and methods for power
generation that will allow it to economically compete with other power
generators. In 2011, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in partnership
with the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI), proposed a National
13

Id.
David A. Repka & Tyson R. Smith, A Dose of History: Nuclear Energy Cases That
Shaped Environmental Law, 25 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 28, 28 (2010).
15
Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures & S. States Energy Bd., Nuclear Waste: A Guide to
Understanding Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going,
https://www.ncsl.org/documents/environ/NCSLNuclearWaste.pdf.
16
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, HISTORY
OF U.S. WIND ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/wind/history-us-wind-energy (last
visited Mar. 11, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5NTX-W2QZ].
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
14
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Offshore Wind Strategy, allocating over $160 million dollars to pilot
projects.20 Currently, all renewable energy sources collectively produce
approximately seventeen percent of U.S. energy (with wind energy
making up about seven percent of the total).21 While it is projected that
offshore wind could have a generation capacity of 177 gigawatts per year
by 2030 (from a 2018 capacity of approximately twenty-two gigawatts),
the current uncertainty in the regulatory framework for delivering
renewable energy to consumers has caused investors to hesitate.22
Part II of this article explores the history of nuclear energy, the
mechanisms of control employed by the NRC, the struggles the industry
has faced in the last few decades, and what, if any, future there is for
nuclear power to play a role in meeting the rising global energy demand
in an era of rapid human-induced climate change. In part III of this article,
OSW development is surveyed, focusing on current economic,
environmental, and social concerns that OSW must address if it is to be a
viable electricity generator in the next few decades. In parts IV and V,
these two vastly different energy sources are compared, looking at what
lessons can be learned by the OSW energy sector from nuclear power’s
short but turbulent history. Because, while nuclear power and offshore
wind energy are different beasts altogether, the traits they share (as zerocarbon emitters) may be more important than those they do not. This
article argues that the development of both nuclear power and offshore
wind power is critical to addressing the climate change crisis. Nuclear
power may be a long-term solution to reducing GHGs, but it cannot be the
short-term solution because of the expense and long timeline for
constructing new nuclear reactors and power plants. Offshore wind, on the
other hand, could potentially be both a short and long-term solution, if the
industry can quickly address and correct the areas posing significant
delays in its employment.

20

Id.
What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 (last visited Nov.
30, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5VQM-6J9A].
21

22

William Mathis & Jeremy Hodges, Renewables Investor Embrace ‘Enormous Game’
of Offshore Wind, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/renewables-investor-embracesenormous-game-of-offshore-wind [https://perma.cc/UN4G-LPBJ].
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE U.S.
A. The History of Nuclear Power Production
The end of the Second World War saw the beginning of the nuclear
age. The world, and specifically the U.S., saw the energy potential of the
atom, and sought to harness that power in electrical energy production.
The generation of nuclear power involves a controlled chain reaction in
which the atoms of fuel (uranium) are split, releasing energy (heat) and
radiation (subatomic particles). That heat can be harnessed to boil water,
create steam, and power turbine generators, producing electricity. The
nuclear power process can generally be broken down into four stages: (1)
mining and fuel enrichment for use in power generation; (2) design and
construction of the nuclear power plant; (3) operation; and (4) the storage
and disposal of the spent nuclear fuel (decommissioning). Spent nuclear
fuel (SNF) is the state of the nuclear material when it has reached the end
of its usable life.23 At this stage, the fuel is still radioactive—although not
usable to generate enough heat to power an electricity production plant—
and requires special methods to store and contain the residual radiation
while the material continues to decay to levels not harmful to humans over
the next hundreds-of-thousands of years.24
A brief history of uranium mining for use as nuclear fuel can be traced
back to Colorado, where by the 1950s about 800 uranium mines were in
operation.25 Uranium mining operations have been largely curtailed, and
it is currently done on a small scale in only a few western states.26 Uranium
is extracted using various methods including stripping away the surface of
the earth (referred to as open pit mining), traditional underground mining,
and a process called in-situ leaching (where water and a gaseous
compound are pumped into the bedrock, dissolving the uranium in the
solution).27 The enrichment process (necessary for fuel viability) removes
impurities in the ore, leaving behind toxic, radioactive impurities that must
be safely disposed of.28
23

Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures & S. States Energy Bd., supra note 15.
Id.
25
William Jenney, Having Your Yellow Cake and Eating it Too: The Environmental and
Health Impacts of Uranium Mining on the Colorado Plateau, 7 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 27, 29 (2016).
26
U.S. Uranium Mining and Exploration, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N., https://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/us-uranium-mining.aspx
(last visited Dec. 21, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ZY8A-KW9C].
27
Id.
28
Id.
24
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The NRC is involved at every stage of the permitting and licensing
of a commercial nuclear reactor. The ultimate design and construction of
a power reactor may vary with advances in technology, the proposed site,
and electricity generation requirements, but there are only two types of
commercial reactors used in the United States—the Boiling Water Reactor
(BWR) and Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR).29 Under its regulatory
requirements (contained in Chapter I of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations) and guidance, the NRC conducts extensive reviews of a
proposed power reactor including conducting an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), siting and safety reviews, construction permits, and
operator licensing.30 Similarly, the NRC’s oversight does not end at the
completion of construction, but continues throughout the life of the reactor
through operator licensing, inspections and auditing, and adjudication.31
The safe disposal and storage of SNF and other high-level waste (to
be distinguished from low-level waste generated through medical and
other industrial uses) generated in the operation of a nuclear power plant
requires significant attention from states and the federal government.32
The federal government is ultimately responsible for the development of
a long-term management strategy for SNF.33 Currently there is no national
repository for SNF after Yucca Mountain—the long-term storage solution
designated by the DOE in 2002—lost support and funding. 34
The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) gave the original AEC the duty of
encouraging the development of commercial nuclear energy, as well as its
regulation.35 The AEC, attempting to implement regulations that
rigorously protected the health and safety of the public without hampering
29

Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures & S. States Energy Bd., Supra note 15.

30

Regulations, Guidance, and Communications for New Reactors, NUCLEAR
REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/regs-guidescomm.html#erp (last visited Oct. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/28ST-NJ4B].
31

See How We Regulate, NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/regulatory.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7KEH-6G3P].
32
See The Future of Nuclear Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Energy and
Water Development, Comm. On Appropriations, 114th Cong. 4-5 [hereinafter Hearing]
(statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein); 42 USCS § 10222 (2012).
33
42 U.S.C. § 10131(4).
34
Hearing, supra note 32, at 4 (Sen. Feinstein also highlighted the problem facing states,
discussing how California alone has “nearly 8,000 highly radioactive spent-fuel
assemblies stored in pools and dry cask across four sites, all of which are now shut down
or are planning to shut down, leaving behind just the waste.”); Nat’l Conf. of State
Legislatures & S. States Energy Bd., Supra note 15.
35
History, NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/history.html (last
visited Oct. 29, 2020) [https://perma.cc/AX4J-GYDM].
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the development of the new nuclear power industry, initially met with
much public criticism.36 Critics challenged that the regulations did not
adequately address “radiation protection standards, reactor safety, plant
siting, and environmental protection.”37 As a result of the harsh
commentary, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 reconstituted the
AEC into the ERDA and NRC, with the NRC continuing only the licensing
and related regulatory functions of the AEC.38
It is important to note that the dangers involved in producing nuclear
power (including using nuclear materials for other industrial and medical
purposes) relate to its potential radiative effects on humans. Nuclear
fission releases subatomic particles that, if not properly contained and
controlled, can pose a hazard to human health by interacting with and
damaging, or even killing, human cells. While humans are exposed to
various types of low-level radiation on a daily basis, the threat of the
improper release of radiation from nuclear material is the public’s
exposure to “hazardous levels” of radiation.39
The primary focus of this article is the NRC’s function as the
regulatory body for civilian nuclear power plants (the NRC also performs
various other functions, including preventing nuclear material theft by
hostile groups). The NRC is involved at every stage of a power reactor’s
lifespan by developing standards, licensing, certifying, inspecting,
assessing, investigating and adjudicating, and decommissioning.40 The
NRC’s primary goal is to eliminate the threat of public exposure to
hazardous radiation from nuclear power generation by imposing effective
reactor safety requirements for civilian-run nuclear power plants. In
furtherance of this goal, the NRC was given latitude to implement
extensive “reactor safety oversight and reactor license renewal of existing
plants . . . and waste management of . . . high-level waste . . . .”41 Currently,
the NRC is reviewing license applications for new nuclear reactor plants
throughout the U.S.42

36

Id.
Id.
38
Id.; 10 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2015).
39
NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, supra note 35.
40
NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, supra note 31.
41
NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, supra note 35.
42
Locations of New Nuclear Power Reactor Applications, NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N,
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col/new-reactor-map.html (last visited Nov.
18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/U7LT-E77T].
37
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B. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The five NRC Commissioners are appointed by the President,
confirmed by the Senate, and serve for a five-year term.43 The NRC is
given broad discretion in the means used to carry out their regulatory
functions including, “standards setting and rulemaking; technical reviews
and studies; public hearings; issuance of authorizations, permits, and
licenses; inspection, investigation, and enforcement; evaluation of
operating experience; and confirmatory research.”44 However, the NRC’s
heavy regulatory hand does not diminish the role of other organizations
and governmental agencies in consulting with and advising the
Commission on issues such as public health and environmental
protection.45
From initial plant siting to end-of-life fuel storage, the NRC’s reach
into the commercial use of nuclear energy is extensive.46 Additionally, the
NRC issues guidance to nuclear facility licensees to aid in their
compliance with federal regulations.47
Certain nuclear power activities within the NRC’s authority require
Environmental Impact Statements (EISs).48 EISs are conducted in
accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).49 The
EIS contains a concise and detailed analysis, using environmental and
social sciences, of the impact of a proposal on the environment and public,
including investigating possible alternatives to minimize that impact.50
43

10 C.F.R. § 1.11(a).
Id. § 1.11(b) (also as mandated by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, and in
accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, as well as
other relevant statutes.).
45
Federal, State, and Tribal Liaison Programs, NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N,
https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/state-tribal/fstliaison.html#:~:text=The%20NRC%20works%20cooperatively%20with,and%20efficien
cy
%20in%20Federal%20services (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/7BNRX8XL]. The NRC cooperates and communicates with other federal agencies, state
governments, and Native American Tribal governments. Id.
46
NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, supra note 31.
47
Id.
48
10 C.F.R. § 51.20(b).
49
NEPA is a comprehensive piece of environmental legislation requiring all federal
agencies to assess the impact of their proposed projects on the environment—including
social, economic, and security concerns. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2015).
50
Id. § 1502.1 (“[the EIS] shall provide full and fair discussion of significant
environmental impacts and shall inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable
alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the
human environment.”).
44
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Federal agencies, in order to comply with NEPA requirements, have
adopted tailored procedures for conducting EISs and Environmental
Assessments (EAs).51 The NRC requires an EIS (or a supplement to an
existing EIS) be prepared as part of a Combined License (COL)
Application, or early site permit application, for a commercial nuclear
power plant—a less intensive EA is required for a design certification
application.52 An approved COL Application authorizes the applicant to
construct and operate a nuclear reactor at a designated site, and is valid for
forty years with a possible renewal of up to twenty years.53 In the case of
an application for a “limited work authorization, construction permit, early
site permit, or [COL]” of a nuclear facility, a notice of hearing is published
in the FEDERAL REGISTER.54 Additionally, the NRC publishes a notice of
intent in the FEDERAL REGISTER stating that an EIS will be prepared.55
Once the EIS is complete, a notice of availability is published stating “that
copies of the final statement or any supplement to the final statement are
available for public inspection . . . .”56 The final environmental review and
safety review become part of the hearings mandated by the AEA prior to
issuing a new permit.57
C. Areas of Federal and State Authority
The basic structure of the nuclear power industry is built upon the
heavy oversight of the federal government in the commercial
development, construction, and operation of nuclear power reactors. State
51

The Environmental Assessment is a concise report on the “environmental impacts of a
proposed action and alternatives,” and assists in an agency’s compliance with NEPA,
helps to determine whether an EIS is required (or in the alternative a finding of no
significant impact), and aids in the preparation of an EIS should it be required. 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.9. The NRC utilizes NUREG-1555, “Environmental Standard Review Plan”
(ESRP), and NUREG-1748, “Environmental Review Guidance for Licensing Actions
Associated with NMSS Programs” to conduct its environmental reviews. NUCLEAR
REGUL. COMM’N, supra note 30.
52
10 C.F.R. § 51.20(b); NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, supra note 30.
53
10 C.F.R. §§ 51.104, 54.31.
54
Id. § 2.104.
55
Id. § 51.116.
56
Id. § 51.118. During this drafting period, the NRC reviews, comments on, and
“make[s] appropriate changes to the EIS.” NRC’s Environmental Review Process,
NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/regs-guidescomm/erp.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/5WVQ-GJ5N].
57
Repka & Smith, supra note 14, at 29; NRC Licensing Process, NUCLEAR REGUL.
COMM’N, https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/new-licensing-files/new-rx-licenseprocess.pdf. (last visited Nov. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/X448-PKKV].
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authority to regulate and control the “the generation, sale or transmission
of electric power [generated by nuclear power plants] licensed by the
[NRC]” is authorized to the extent that those activities do not impinge
upon the NRC’s broad authority in regulating nuclear matters for the
protection and security of the public from radiation hazards.58 In other
words, the ultimate responsibility of protecting the public from radiation
hazards resides with the NRC (some authority may, by agreement, be
delegated to states); however the NRC’s authority does not affect states’
ability to regulate “activities for purposes other than the protection against
radiation hazards.”59 But, if the NRC enters into an agreement with a State
for one of the allowed purposes under 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b), the State then
does have the authority to regulate “for the protection of the public health
and safety from radiation hazards.”60
The long-term storage and disposal of SNF from decommissioned
reactors remains a complex issue for the NRC, states, and the federal
government.61 The AEA specifically confers a duty upon any “person,
agency, or other entity” proposing a site or method for disposing or storing
SNF to notify the NRC as soon as possible after planning begins.62 In turn,
the NRC has the duty to notify the relevant State’s Governor and
legislature of such a proposal.63 Furthermore, the NRC is “directed to
prepare a report on means for improving the opportunities for State
participation” in the nuclear lifecycle, including planning SNF storage and
disposal facilities.64 Moreover, the NRC is the licensing body for
independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs)—interim storage

58

42 U.S.C. § 2018. The NRC’s “authority and responsibility” for regulating “the
construction and operation of any production or utilization facility or any uranium
enrichment facility” is absolute and cannot be transferred to any state. Id. § 2021.
59
Id. §§ 2021(a)-(c), (k).
60
Id. § 2021(b).
61
Spent fuel rods are initially moved to on-site Spent Fuel Pools, or to Dry Cask Storage
systems located on-site or at Consolidate Interim Storage Facilities (CISF). Storage of
Spent Nuclear Fuel, NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuelstorage.html (last visited Oct. 30. 2020) [https://perma.cc/KJF3-ULPY]. SNF can be
safely stored using these systems, but due to the extremely long half-life of the spent
fuel’s radioactive isotopes, and the lack of permanent federal repository, operating
nuclear plants are reaching their on-site capacity for storage. Nat’l Conf. of State
Legislatures & S. States Energy Bd., supra note 15. The accumulation of nuclear waste at
reactor plants and the lack of an effective federal solution has created a “national
problem.” 42 U.S.C. at § 10131.
62
42 U.S.C. § 2021a(a).
63
Id.
64
Id.
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complexes for SNF and related radioactive waste.65 The federal
government is responsible “to provide for the permanent disposal of highlevel radioactive waste and [SNF].”66 Nuclear waste generators—such as
power plants—are responsible to pay the cost of, and plan for, the interim
storage of such waste.67 But, state and local government involvement in
the “planning and development of repositories” is seen as “essential [in
promoting] public confidence in the safety and disposal of such waste and
spent fuel.”68
The DOE’s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management was
given the mission of developing and managing a federal program for the
permanent storage and disposal of SNF and other high-level waste.69
Yucca Mountain, located in Nevada, was proposed as a potential site for a
permanent federal repository in 2002, but the license application was
ultimately suspended in 2010, leaving the future of a federal repository in
limbo.70 Currently, there are over 100 storage sites for SNF in thirty-nine
states; furthermore, various private entities and state and local
governments are in the process of filing applications with the NRC for
interim storage facilities located within their territory.71 Spent fuel from
decommissioned reactors remains an important consideration in the
current state of nuclear power, and to its future potential.72
Separate, but related to the issue of nuclear waste disposal authority,
is the delegation of authority regarding the development—and
regulation—of the nuclear power industry in the context of a state’s
electricity industry. The Supreme Court case, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, held that states have
65

10 C.F.R. § 72.3.
42 U.S.C. § 10131.
67
Id. §§ 10131(a)(4)-(5). The AEA also established a Nuclear Waste Fund, financed
through mandatory fees imposed on generators and owners of nuclear waste, to ensure
that “the costs of carrying out activities relating to the disposal of such waste and spent
fuel will be borne by the persons responsible for generating such waste and spent fuel.”
Id. § 10131(b)(4).
68
Id. § 10131(a)(6).
69
Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures & S. States Energy Bd., supra note 15.
70
Id. At the time of this article, Yucca Mountain is being re-evaluated as a potential
storage and disposal facility. M ARK HOLT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33461, CIVILIAN
NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL 1 (2018). The NRC Safety Evaluation Report and EIS were
completed in 2016, with funding proposed for licensing Yucca Mountain and interim
repositories. Id.
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Id. at 35-36; Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures & S. States Energy Bd., supra note 15.
72
42 U.S.C. § 10131 (finding that “a national problem has been created by the
accumulation of [SNF],” and that “high-level radioactive waste and [SNF] have become
major subjects of public concern.”).
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some latitude in controlling the development of nuclear power within their
borders through laws addressing economic (vice radiological safety)
concerns.73 In that case, a California statute conditioned the construction
of nuclear power plants within the state on the State Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission)
finding “that adequate storage facilities and means of disposal [were]
available for nuclear waste . . . .”74 The two statute provisions at issue
were: (1) a prohibition on the construction of new reactor plants until the
Energy Commission determined “on a case-by-case basis that there will
be ‘adequate capacity’ for storage of a plant’s [SNF]” at the time such
storage is required, and that the generator had the capacity to store the full
reactor core on-site—i.e., the interim storage of SNF; and (2) an overall
“moratorium on the certification of new nuclear plants” until a permanent
federal repository was designated and approved—i.e., the long-term
storage of SNF.75 The petitioners (various electric power companies and
the United States) argued that the statute provisions were preempted by
the AEA because the provisions attempted to regulate the construction of
nuclear power plants and “is allegedly predicated on safety concerns”
(areas reserved to the NRC’s authority).76 In other words, the petitioners’
argument was that the statute regulated the construction of power reactors,
which conflicted with Congressional and NRC decisions about the
handling of SNF, and interfered with the AEA’s purpose of developing
nuclear energy technology and use. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit’s holding that the first provision—regarding interim SNF
storage—was not ripe for review because the courts could not determine
whether the case-by-case determination of the Energy Commission would
ever find a facility’s storage capacity inadequate.77 As to the second
provision, the Court reasoned that a moratorium, while not pre-empted by
the AEA per se, would be prohibited if “grounded in safety concerns.”78
73

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 223 (1983) (“the legal reality remains that Congress has left sufficient authority in
the States to allow the development of nuclear power be slowed or even stopped for
economic reasons.”).
74
Id. at 194.
75
Id. at 197-98 (quoting Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 25524.1(b) (Deering 1977)).
76
Id. at 204 (stating that the statute “ignor[ed] the division between federal and state
authority [and] f[ell] within the field” preserved for the exclusive control of the federal
government).
77
Id. at 203.
78
Id. at 213 (discussing also that a state’s prohibition on nuclear power development
after deciding that nuclear power is generally unsafe would similarly conflict with federal
authority.).
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The question then, was whether there was a non-radiological safety
rationale for the moratorium.79 The Court accepted California’s stated
economic motive for the moratorium.80 Additionally, the Court
determined that the moratorium did not seek “to impose its own standards
on nuclear waste disposal,” and was not at odds with the NRC’s
regulations—which are grounded in safety concerns, not economic
concerns.81
Another area where states may regulate nuclear matters is the mining
of uranium, a common fuel used in power reactor fuel rods. In 2019, Va.
Uranium, Inc. v. Warren held that a state ban on mining operations on
private land within its territory was not pre-empted by the AEA.82 In Va.
Uranium, Petitioner Virginia Uranium, Inc., challenged a Virginia law that
instituted a state-wide ban on uranium mining in Virginia.83 Virginia
Uranium argued that the Virginia law was preempted by the AEA in
violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.84 Specifically
that the AEA granted the NRC sole regulatory power over uranium mining
operations.85 In affirming the Fourth Circuit’s holding, the Supreme Court
reasoned that while the AEA grants the NRC significant regulatory
authority at all phases of the nuclear life cycle, including the construction
of nuclear plants, and the “milling, transfer, use, and disposal of uranium,”
it specifically leaves out the historically-controlled area of mining on
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Id.
Id. at 216 (explaining that the California Assembly Committee on Resources, Land
Use, and Energy, which proposed the statute provision at issue, specifically reported that
SNF disposal was a largely economic, not safety, issue). The Court noted that not only is
it pointless to try and determine why a legislator voted, it is “clear that the States have
been allowed to retain authority over the need for electrical generating facilities easily
sufficient to permit a State so inclined to halt the construction of new nuclear power
plants by refusing on economic grounds . . . .” Id. The Court also discussed the economic
ramifications of the build-up of SNF in Spent Fuel Pools past capacity, which could force
reactors to have to shut down, and the increasing economic risk to construct and operate
new reactors without a permanent long-term storage facility. Id. at 195-96.
81
Id. 218-19.
82
Va. Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894, 1900, 1902 (2019) (explaining that the
NRC may regulate uranium mining on federal lands, but if the NRC desires to mine on
private land, it must purchase that land “by eminent domain and make it federal land”).
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1901-07 (arguing that the AEA solely occupied “the field of radiation safety in
uranium mining”, and that the statute conflicted with the Congressional intent of
“developing nuclear power while mitigating its safety and environmental costs”).
85
Id. Virginia Uranium maintained that it was free to mine in Virginia because the
NRC—the sole regulatory authority—had said nothing to prohibit uranium mining. Id. at
1901.
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private lands to the states.86 Additionally, an analysis of the law
“suggest[ed] that Congress elected to leave mining regulations on private
land to the States.”87
Given the controversial nature of nuclear fission’s most infamous use
in atomic weapons, funding required for the research and development of
nuclear technology, concerns about national security, and safely guarding
the public health from the associated radiation hazards, all led to the early
formation of the robust federal oversight program of nuclear energy. The
AEC (and then NRC) was given almost exclusive authority to regulate
every aspect of the nuclear life cycle, from the initial extraction of uranium
ore at the milling phase (where uranium ore is filtered and turned into
“yellowcake”) to the disposal of spent fuel rods from a decommissioned
reactor.88 Despite this authority, states are not powerless to regulate
nuclear matters within their territories. Amendments to the AEA and the
judicial upholding of state law that regulated certain nuclear matters
solidified the State’s role in regulating nuclear energy for purposes other
than radiation safety, while acknowledging the distinct boundary at which
state authority ends and that of the NRC begins.
D. Special Protections and Subsidies
The uncertainties faced by nuclear power plant developers include:
(1) the technical uncertainties in cost, time, effort, and materials associated
with innovative reactor design; (2) the land, labor, and material costs
associated with construction; and (3) the risk that a developer will not be
able to recoup its capital investment due to changes in the price of
uranium, electricity demand, competing energy resources technology, and
federal and state policy changes throughout the life of the reactor plant.89
These uncertainties risk the unprofitability of building and operating a
nuclear power plant, and hinder the investment into new nuclear power
plant construction.90 From its inception in the 1950s to the early 1970s,
the nuclear power industry amassed support from both the public and
86

Id. at 1900. The AEA specifically states that the NRC’s authority begins “after
[uranium’s] removal from its place of deposit in nature.” Id. at 1902.
87
Id. at 1908. The Court declined to perform an inquiry into the purpose and intent of the
Virginia legislature, stating that Virginia’s law prohibiting mining was “far removed from
the NRC’s historic power,” and therefore such an inquiry would be inappropriate. Id. at
1904.
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Id. at 1900, 1902.
89
T.L. Fahring, Nuclear Uncertainty: A Look at the Uncertainties of a U.S. Nuclear
Renaissance, 41 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 283-84 (2011).
90
Id. at 284-85.
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government.91 During this period, recognizing the need for investment
into nuclear technology, the federal government took an aggressive pronuclear stance, passing legislation that incentivized and subsidized
research and development into nuclear energy, and attempted to streamline
the permitting process for new power plants—effectively reducing
uncertainty for would-be investors and developers.92 To that end, various
development subsidies have been granted in the form of tax credits, fuel
and enrichment subsidies, subsidies associated with developing health and
national security regulations, and liability limits for nuclear accidents.93
One of the most important subsidizations of the nuclear power
industry was the Price-Anderson Act (the “Act”), which limited a private
developer’s liability for public harm caused by nuclear accidents
associated with nuclear power generation.94 Under the act, nuclear energy
developers were only liable to cover a fraction of what the potential worstcase nuclear accident liabilities would be (the maximum coverage
insurance companies were willing to provide was about sixty million and
the worst-case scenario estimated liabilities of about five to seven billion);
essentially, the Act capped the liability for nuclear accidents at a low $560
million, with the government accountable for the largest portion of such
liabilities.95 This liability cap and relatively small upfront insurance cost
was seen as a necessary measure to reduce uncertainty in the new industry,
and unburdened developers’ fears of future insurance payouts for a, albeit
unlikely, nuclear incident.96
The AEA also created a scholarship and fellowship program,
allowing the NRC to award scholarships and fellowships to certain
students who agreed to be employed by the NRC in certain areas of
science.97 The areas of study were broad, and included “science,
engineering, or another field of study that the Commission determines is
in a critical skill area related to [its] regulatory mission.”98
91

Id. at 285. The nuclear power industry, initially designed as a federal monopoly, was
opened to private developers who could receive licenses from the AEC to operate nuclear
facilities. Id. at 286.
92
Id. at 286
93
Id. at 286-88.
94
Id. at 286; 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (“The [NRC] shall [for licenses requiring financial
protection of less the $560 million dollars] agree to indemnify and hold harmless the
licensee and other persons indemnified . . . from public liability arising from nuclear
incidents which is in excess of the level of financial protection required of the licensee.”).
95
96

Fahring, supra note 89, at 286.
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Research grants, loans, and other types of development assistance
were also important programs authorized by the AEA.99 The AEC was
given broad discretion to distribute funds to private and public institutions
in the form of loans, grants, agreements, and equipment in support of
education, training, and research and development related to nuclear
processes and radiation.100
These subsidies, combined with relatively straight forward and
simple licensing procedures, contributed to the early boom and success of
the nuclear power sector.101
Thus, between the 1950s and 1970s, the nuclear energy sector enjoyed
favorable governmental policy, generally received public support (or at
least little pushback), and was projected to be a cheap, prolific, and
widespread electricity source in the United States.102 But, the post-1970s
saw an increase in public skepticism of nuclear power’s possible effects
on health and safety, national security, and the environment.103 The
nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island during the 1970s
and 1980s did little to allay the growing public fear of nuclear energy.104
Furthermore, reductions or eliminations of certain subsidies, concerns that
the newly created NRC was overlooking safety defects in the name of
construction and production, and the growing uncertainty of future storage
and disposal of SNF, increased uncertainty in the market and choked the
nuclear power industry at every level of development—effectively making
it unable to compete with traditional fossil fuel-powered plants.105 As a
result, no new reactors were constructed for over two decades after the late
1970s.106
Since the late 1980s there have been various revitalization efforts at
the federal and state government level to reinvigorate the nuclear power
industry.107 The NRC made efforts to streamline the licensing process—
99

Id. § 2051(a)-(b).
Id.
101
See Fahring, supra note 89, at 287-88.
102
See Id. at 288 (describing how subsidies, public support, and smooth licensing led to a
spurt of new construction, with the government projecting the construction of thousands
of new plants and assuring the public that the electricity produced would be extremely
cheap).
103
Id. (discussing the public’s growing “disillusionment with the industry”).
104
See Id.
105
See Id. at 288-92 (discussing, for example, a 1975 amendment to the Price-Anderson
Act which removed public funding for liability coverage).
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Nuclear Power in the USA, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N., https://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/usa-nuclear-power.aspx
(last visited Nov. 17, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ANC2-8QKY].
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after finding that the previous licensing procedure, although simple, was
fraught with defects that actually contributed to uncertainty in the
industry—by creating Early Site Permits that allowed developers to begin
safety, environmental, and emergency preparedness reviews early on,
Standard Design Certifications that created an “off the shelf” design
option, and the Combined Construction and Operating License (COL) that
functioned as a construction and operation license.108 In a related effort,
the DOE created the Nuclear Power 2010 program, which created a “fiftyfifty cost-sharing agreement” that shared the cost of testing the new
licensing process with developers.109 Another revitalization mechanism
was the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which incentivized new construction
through renewed tax credits, insurance subsidies, and loan guarantees
(given to energy production technologies that limit or eliminate
emissions).110 More recently, certain states have adopted Zero-emission
Credit (ZEC) programs that compensate nuclear power plants for their
carbon-free operation.111
While the future of nuclear power in the United States remains
uncertain, a few points seem clear. First, public support for, or opposition
of, nuclear power has fueled policy shifts regarding nuclear energy
subsidies and development. Second, the stalemate over a site for the
permanent repository for SNF, the high costs associated with construction,
significant delays, and the availability of cheaper energy sources such as
coal and natural gas has greatly suppressed the construction of new power
reactors in the U.S. Third, electrical energy demands are rapidly increasing
every year. Climate change has become an unavoidable consideration in
the energy industry; specifically the controversy over burning fossil fuels
such as coal and natural gas, which make up the largest percentage of our
electricity generation capacity (slightly over sixty percent).112 At this time,
nuclear power (which provides approximately twenty percent of electricity
generation in the U.S.) is the only electrical power generator that can
simultaneously meet rising consumer energy demands while decreasing
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Id. at 295-97.
Id. at 298.
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energy projects. Id.
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ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41534 [https://perma.cc/W4PTTTNV].
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GHG emissions contributing to climate change.113 But, the significant cost
and timeline for bringing a new nuclear reactor online, combined with the
need to rapidly reduce global emissions to meet climate change targets,
means that nuclear power cannot alone provide the short-term solution.114
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF OFFSHORE WIND POWER IN THE
U.S.
A. The History of Wind Power in the U.S.
The driving forces behind the investment into renewable energy are
politically, environmentally, and socially motivated. Today, the effects of
global warming are being felt more acutely. Sea level is rising dangerously
in some areas, storms are intensifying, and extensive drought periods and
more frequent heat waves are impacting every sector of the economy and
every human life. Changes in the earth’s climate have altered fragile
ecosystems, affected our agricultural sector and food supply chains, put
city populations and infrastructure at risk (sea level rise continues to
encroach on coastal communities while acid rain corrodes infrastructure),
and has put the public health at risk from increased air pollution and
compromised water quality.115
Even before climate change and climate science became true
foundations for policy, the U.S. was attempting to reduce its reliance on
foreign energy resources, most significantly oil. The 1970’s oil and gas
shortage in the increasingly energy-hungry U.S., combined with
skyrocketing prices, led lawmakers to reassess the U.S. dependence on
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Ken Silverstein, If Nuclear Energy Is Replaced By Natural Gas, Say Goodbye to
Climate Goals, FORBES (May 10, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2019/05/10/if-nuclear-energy-is-replaced-bynatural-gas-say-goodbye-to-climate-goals/?sh=2defae2c2016 [https://perma.cc/6HB2698D]; Chris Mooney, It’s the First New U.S. Reactor in Decades. And Climate Change
Has Made That a Very Big Deal, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 18, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/06/17/the-u-s-ispowering-up-its-first-new-nuclear-reactor-in-decades/ (discussing that as nuclear plants
shut down, solar and wind are unable to keep up with the electricity-generating capacity
of nuclear power, which could actually increase emissions due to the need to rely more
on fossil fuels to pick up the slack) [https://perma.cc/L43A-T226].
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Mooney, supra note 113 (discussing that international climate change targets that seek
to “keep global warming below 2 degrees or even 1.5 degrees Celsius above late-19thcentury levels” mean emissions reductions need to occur fast).
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The Effects of Climate Change, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/effects/ (last
visited Nov. 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/C9L5-SWKD].
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foreign oil.116 The energy crisis put the issues of energy resource
dependency and consumption on the front burner, and led to energy reform
in the U.S., including efforts to reduce dependency on foreign oil and
promote alternative sources like wind, solar, and nuclear.117
Against this backdrop, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA) of 1978, was enacted to promote energy conservation, and
required state utility companies to purchase a certain amount of electricity
from renewable energy sources.118 Additionally, Congress promoted
research, production, and the purchase of electricity from renewable
energy through legislation such as the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (which,
for example, created tax credits for renewable energy), and the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (which extended some renewable energy provisions,
and attempted to stimulate investment into renewable and sustainable
energy).119 As alternatives to legislation, resources have been devoted to
promoting the research and development of renewable energy, including
wind. The National Wind Technology Center, built in the 1990s, was
designated as the U.S. central hub for wind technology development, and
in 2011, the DOE and DOI released a National Offshore Wind Strategy—
an initiative designed to reduce energy costs through investment in wind
technology.120
B. Land-based Wind Power
The first major development in wind energy was land-based wind
power, originally developed for use in the western U.S.121 The late
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries brought with them the innovation
116

Energy Crisis (1970s), HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/1970s/energy-crisis
(last visited Nov. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/H3KD-9SV5].
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History of U.S. Wind Energy, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE
ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/wind/history-us-wind-energy (last visited
Nov. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5NTX-W2QZ].
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119

Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.); Energy
Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C., 10 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 30 U.S.C., 40 U.S.C., 42
U.S.C.).
120
121

OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, supra note 118.
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of turbine design, and the shift from windmills as pumping power to
windmills as electrical power. PURPA promoted investment into
renewable energy sources like wind power, including investment into the
first utility-scale, land-based wind farm in California.122 As wind
technology developed, many organizations contributed to its research and
development, including NASA (developing a method for predicting
turbine performance),123 the National Renewable Energy Laboratory
(NREL) (conducting extensive research and data analysis on wind power
plants, and working with industry leaders to advance land-based wind
power use and reliability),124 and the Wind Energy Technologies Office
(WETO) (investing into the research and development of wind technology
and sciences).125 Due to the fact that offshore wind turbines have the
potential to produce substantially greater amounts of energy than their
land-based equivalents—due to more abundant, frequent, and consistent
wind resources at sea—there has been a relatively recent shift towards
offshore wind development.126
C. Offshore Wind Power
OSW is increasingly being utilized globally, with the United
Kingdom coming in at the top with the largest market for power generated
by offshore wind in the world—with other European countries, Asia, and
the U.S. following.127 The U.S., for its part, recognizing the abundant and
untapped wind resources of the oceans and Great Lakes of the U.S.,
released the first National Offshore Wind Strategy in 2011.128 The
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Strategy outlined the potential value and challenges associated with the
development of OSW as a renewable energy competitor in coastal-state
energy markets.129 Some of the challenges included overcoming the high
cost of energy produced by wind power, installation and grid
interconnections, the lack of site data (i.e., geological and metocean data),
and the lack of industry experience.130 Research and development, test
projects, and data collection followed. In 2016, the DOE and DOI released
an updated National Offshore Wind Strategy to address changes in the
energy policy landscape in the U.S., new domestic and foreign energy
markets, innovative wind technology, and state actions taken to promote
renewable energy sales within their borders.131 The 2016 National
Offshore Wind Strategy included federal action items targeted at reducing
uncertainty and increasing reliability in the OSW industry including: (1)
advancing methods for obtaining metocean and geological conditions; (2)
advancing wind plant technology (adapting existing and developing new
technology catered to U.S. potential wind plant sites which could meet
rigorous safety standards); (3) streamlining and re-assessing current
supply chains of wind plant components (including port access for
imported parts, and manufacturing capabilities of U.S. facilities); (4)
streamlining the regulatory process for planning, siting, constructing, and
operating a wind plant (modifying site assessment plan requirements to be
less costly, providing greater flexibility in leasing, promoting efficient
intergovernmental coordination, and developing safety guidelines); (5)
furthering research efforts to understand and mitigate OSW effects on
other ocean resources (e.g., effects on coastal environments and
communities, wildlife and habitat impacts, commercial uses, military
operations, and radar systems used by the military and the Federal
Aviation Administration); (6) analyzing and optimizing methods of grid
interconnection and integration (i.e., for OSW to compete with other
energy sources, and for state and regional energy stakeholders to
incorporate OSW into the local energy market, there must be a cost
effective and reliable path to transmit electricity generated by OSW to
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coastal load centers); and (7) developing investor-friendly policies and
increasing confidence through pilot projects.132
The DOI’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) is
responsible for the regulation, management, and development of offshore
resources in the U.S.133 Any OSW project proposed in federal waters is
subject to the licensing process administered by BOEM. “Federal waters”
in this usage refers to the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)—that portion of
the “submerged land, subsoil, and seabed” of the United States that is
subject to federal jurisdiction (as opposed to that area under state
jurisdiction or the high seas).134 States may regulate activities within their
jurisdiction (submerged land within three nautical miles from shore), but
certain federal laws may impact the states’ use of their territory. On the
other hand, although the federal government has exclusive authority to
regulate activities in the OCS, extending out to the high seas (200 nautical
miles from shore), several statutes allow for state review of federal
activities in federal waters.135
D. Overview of BOEM Leasing Process
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 granted BOEM regulatory authority
over offshore resources on the OCS.136 BOEM was given the authority to
implement regulations including “issuing leases, easements and rights-ofways for OCS activities that support production and transmission of
renewable energy.”137 BOEM has authority over offshore resources under
Chapter V of Title 30 of the Code of Federal Regulations.138 Even with
132

Id. at 47-64.
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BOEM’s authority over significant aspects of OSW leasing and
development, the regulatory pathway remains a complex process
involving the cooperation of multiple federal, state, and local entities.
To address this complexity, BOEM established Intergovernmental
Renewable Energy Task Forces (Task Forces) in states seeking to promote
and develop OSW projects.139 The Task Force is comprised of all parties
with a relevant interest in the project, and seeks to “collect and
share relevant information that would be useful to BOEM” while it
engages in the leasing process.140
The first phase of the BOEM offshore leasing process is the “planning
and analysis” phase.141 During this initial phase, BOEM may solicit
developers for applications, or might receive unsolicited applications.142
The Task Force, responsible for identifying suitable Wind Energy Areas—
those areas of the OCS most suitable for OSW, may take two years or more
to conduct the necessary investigation to identify these areas.143 The
second phase, leasing, is done competitively, and if there are multiple
applicants, a lease auction may take place.144 If a lease is granted by
BOEM, the developer receives access and rights to produce and sell
electricity generated by OSW, but cannot begin construction at this point
in the process.145
After a lease is granted, the lessee/developer has twelve months to
submit a Site Assessment Plan (SAP) to BOEM for approval.146 The SAP
includes the data and analysis of the potential wind resources, and the
geographical and metocean data of the proposed OSW plant site.147
BOEM conducts extensive environmental and technical reviews of the
SAP, and typically either approves the SAP, or “approves with
conditions.”148 Once the SAP is approved, the final stage of the leasing
process is the Construction and Operations phase.149 The lessee has five
years to engage in further site assessments and submit a Construction and
Operation
139
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Plan (COP), including a decommissioning plan.150 Once the COP is
submitted to BOEM, public comments will be solicited prior to a final
approval decision issued to the developer.151 If the COP is approved, the
developer receives a twenty-five-year permit, with the possibility of a
renewal.152 Typically, in conjunction with this phase, easements to install
the necessary cables, pipelines, and other support structures required to
transmit electricity to shore are issued to the developer. It can take up to
ten years for commercial operation of an offshore wind plant to
commence.
E. NEPA, Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and Other Federal and State
Agency Requirements
Collaboration between BOEM and various federal and state agencies
plays a vital role in permitting and operating OSW facilities. These
agencies include the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s
(NOAA) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Services (USFWS), the Army Corps of Engineers (responsible
for enforcing requirements under the Clean Water Act), the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) (responsible for the
administration of the Federal Aviation Act), and various state agencies—
such as a State’s Department of Nature Resources.153
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) provides the federal
framework for assessing the acceptability of Wind Energy Areas
(WEAs)—areas offshore considered most well-suited for OSW.154 BOEM
conducts an Environmental Assessment (EA) of any proposed OSW
project, providing the public and officials with a comprehensive study of

150

Id.
Id.
152
Id.
151
153

See Jeffery Thaler, Permitting and Leasing Roadmap for Offshore Maine
Wind Energy Projects, OFFSHORE WIND ENERGY PROJECT ROADMAP 9-19
(2013),
https://e2tech.org/Resources/Documents/MOWII_Offshore_Wind_Roadmap_J
AN2013.pdf (discussing the various federal statutes that must be taken into

account and federal permits required for a state to install and
operate an OSW project in state waters) [https://perma.cc/9CXYXKRN]. However, these considerations are applicable to projects
in federal waters as well. Wochner & Tohan, supra note 145, at 13.
154

Wochner & Tohan, supra note 145, at 15.

2021]

ATOMIC ENERGY AND OFFSHORE WIND

51

the potential environmental consequences of a proposed wind plant, which
includes possible mitigation tactics
and any alternatives that could lessen environmental impacts.155 The
EA is conducted as part of the planning and analysis phase of OSW
permitting, in cooperation with other interested agencies, and provides for
a thirty-day public comment period. If no significant effects are indicated
in the EA, a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) is issued.156
Further along in the permitting process, when the BOEM receives the COP
from the developer, it will prepare an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS)—a more detailed, comprehensive, and rigorous analysis of the
potential environmental impacts of a proposed action, with a significant
focus on “objectively evaluat[ing] all reasonable alternatives” to “include
reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead agency,”
allowing the public to make clear and informed decisions on the proposed
action and reasonable alternatives.157
As part of this collaborative framework to assess and analyze the
environmental consequences of a proposed OSW project, BOEM consults
with the NMFS and USFWS on compliance with the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 (ESA).158 BOEM—under the guidance of the NMFS and
USFWS—prepares an assessment of potential impacts to wildlife,
habitats, and endangered species, and proposes measures to reduce any
potential adverse effects.159 Generally, the NMFS and USFWS will give
their concurrence (or not) that the proposed project is unlikely to
negatively impact endangered (or threatened) species (or habitats). If they
do not concur, then a more in-depth, formal examination is conducted,
including reasonable alternatives and measures needed to mitigate those
effects.160 The developer may be required to implement mitigation tactics
that were identified during this consultation process.
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) makes it illegal to “pursue,
hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill . . . any migratory
bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird.”161 If violated, the MBTA
carries with it criminal penalties whether the violation was done
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knowingly or not.162 BOEM utilizes the NEPA process to conduct studies
on the possible impact of OSW development on migratory birds, and
consults with the USFWS—the agency responsible for administering the
MBTA—on offshore projects that could potentially threaten protected
migratory bird species, and on mitigation measures that could be employed
to reduce those risks.163 Risks to migratory birds include “attraction to and
collision with [offshore] structures,” habitat destruction, and those
associated with accidents such as oil spills.164
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) requires federal
activities, “within or outside the coastal zone,” which might impact a
coastal zone to “be carried out in a manner which is consistent to the
maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved
State management programs.”165 Consequently, in the case of an OCS
lease sale by BOEM, a state may object to BOEM’s Consistency
Determination (CD)—a document stating either that the activity is “fully
consistent” or “to the maximum extent practicable” with a State’s
management program; however, BOEM may still proceed with the action
without a state’s permission if the CD fully explains the “legal
impediments to being fully consistent”, or if BOEM determines that the
activity is “fully consistent.”166 In the case of an applicant seeking a
federal license or permit for activities on the OCS, a Consistency
Certification (CC) must be completed before the COP is approved.167
BOEM then submits the CC and proposed development and or
162
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construction plan to the affected states for a consistency review.168 If the
State objects to the CC, BOEM is prohibited from issuing the permit or
license, and the applicant must either appeal the State’s decision, or
resubmit the CC with the appropriate amendments.169
Other important federal statutes affecting BOEM’s OSW licensing
and permitting process include: (1) the Jones Act, requiring vessels
operating between points in U.S. territorial waters and the OCS to be built
in the U.S., owned and controlled by a U.S. citizen, primarily operated by
a U.S. crew, and operated with a coastwise endorsement issued by the U.S.
Coast Guard;170 (2) the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),
which extends U.S. jurisdiction to the OCS “and to all artificial islands,
and all installations and other devices permanently or temporarily attached
to the seabed, which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring
for, developing, or producing resources therefrom;”171 (3) the Clean Water
Act (CWA), requiring any applicant for a federal license or permit to
“construct[] or operat[e] facilities, which may result in any discharge into
the navigable waters,” to provide a certification to the state “in which the
discharge originates or will originate” that it complies with water quality
and effluent standards; and (4) the Clean Water Act (CWA), requiring a
permit (issued by the USACE) to discharge dredging materials into
specified disposal sites in navigable waters.172
The preceding list does not exhaust the federal statutes requiring
consideration in permitting OSW facilities in federal waters. Among other
permissions, the FAA’s approval to erect turbines of a certain height when
installed in certain locations, so to not interfere with navigation radar and
paths, may be required.173 As further considerations, OSW facilities
potentially impact commercial vessel and fishing routes, and military
operations.174
Because of the diversity of the OCS landscape, the many
configurations that a project may take (e.g., floating versus anchored
turbines, federal versus state waters, nuances in State coastal management
programs, and alternatives and mitigation techniques that need to be
considered based on potential sites), the path to developing an OSW plant
168
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may be considerably different in complexity and duration from one project
to the next.
F. A Brief Overview of OSW Technology
The design, materials, and ultimate construction of an offshore wind
facility may vary depending on the terrain, water depth, wind resources
available in the area, the distance from shore, biological habitats in the
area, the surrounding coastal landscape, the number of turbines, flight
paths, military operations, and commercial fishing operations in the
development area. While the ultimate layout of the plant may differ from
one to the next, they all share certain components, including a generator,
foundation, electrical cabling, and substations.
Offshore turbines are traditionally anchored in shallow areas of the
OCS; however, new technology is exploring utilizing floating turbines in
deep water areas of the OCS. Regardless of the method utilized, turbines
must have a foundation that allows them to withstand conditions at sea
including hurricanes, heavy loading from sea currents, and metal fatigue
from constant submersion in salt water. Designs for grounded (or
anchored) foundations include, among others, the monopile (essentially a
single pile driven into the seabed), the gravity foundation (a steel or
concrete platform placed in an area of the seabed terrain specifically
prepared for the foundation to rest), and the jacket foundation (multiple
anchoring points driven into the seabed).175 Floating foundations may be
moored, ballasted, or have buoy-type systems to stabilize them.176
Turbine blades, the most prominent and notable feature on a wind
turbine, harness the kinetic energy of the wind, turning the blades, which
are connected to a gearbox that sits behind the blades in a structure called
the nacelle. The nacelle also contains the turbine’s generator. As the
turbine blades spin, so do the gears in the gear box, stepping up the
rotational speed and ultimately causing the generator to spin This action
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converts the kinetic energy of the wind (and mechanical rotation of the
turbine blades) into electrical energy in the generator.177
The complexities of OSW plant electrical cabling are beyond the
scope of this article, but every OSW facility will have an electrical cable
design layout that connects the offshore turbines to each other (called
inter-array cables), connects the offshore turbines to an offshore
Substation Platform (OSS) (essentially collecting the electricity generated
by the turbines at an offshore structure), and which connect the OSS to an
onshore substation (through the export cable) where the electricity will
ultimately be connected to the regional electricity grid (called an
“interconnection”).178 These high-voltage electrical cables are typically
laid down along or buried in the seabed, although the design would be
altered for floating-foundation wind turbines.179
G. Offshore Wind Projects in the U.S.
Despite the growing concern of climate change, rising energy
demands, and the potential for OSW to lead the way in U.S. clean energy,
the U.S. is still lagging behind countries such as China, the U.K., and other
European nations in developing and harnessing offshore wind
resources.180 Currently, there is only one commercially operating wind
farm offshore near Block Island, Rhode Island. The Block Island plant
came online in 2016, is in state waters, and has a nameplate capacity of
thirty megawatts.181
Concerns in the U.S. about negative environmental impacts, effects
on the U.S. fishing industry, potential conflicts with air traffic routes,
military operations, and commercial vessel routes, high development
costs, lengthy and complex permitting process, the uncertainty of
subsidies and tax credits, and coastal aesthetics, have all kept potential
investors and developers from moving forward on OSW projects up until
recently.
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Cape Wind, proposed by Cape Wind Associates (CWA) in 2001, was
a front-runner in the budding commercial OSW industry in the U.S.182 The
Cape Wind farm was to be installed in the Nantucket Sound (in federal
waters) with a potential output of 174 megawatts.183 The project garnered
much opposition and debate, largely local. The Aquinnah Wampanoag
Tribe of Gay Head claimed that the project would disrupt a spiritual seabed
area.184 A local group of citizens also challenged the FAA’s Determination
of No Hazard with respect to the wind farm’s effect on air navigation.185
Ultimately, CWA relinquished its lease in 2018, effectively hammering
the last nail in the coffin of the Cape Wind project.186
Despite the setbacks of Cape Wind, the phasing out of previously
available federal Production Tax Credits (PTC), and an attitude towards
OSW that shifts with the changing political winds, many states are not
ready to furl the sails of OSW.187 With the eastern seaboard states the prime
target for large-scale OSW development, BOEM has been conducting
lease auctions for areas off the shores of New England states.188 As a result,
companies are seeking federal permits to build large-scale transmission
lines (effectively an OSW transmission infrastructure) to carry windproduced electricity into New England.189 Offshore transmission
infrastructure (requiring connections to existing regional power grids) and
existing regional power grid upgrades (in order to handle the influx and
fluctuations of offshore wind electricity) may be the key to enticing
offshore wind investors and developers to the market.190 It could
182
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significantly reduce OSW development risk by providing known
transmission paths, and reduce the cost for individual developers who
would otherwise have to chart their own transmission paths to connect to
onshore regional grids.191 Some New England states, however, are
skeptical about the cost to upgrade their regional power grids, and about
the lack of clarity, planning, and certainty in the development of offshore
wind projects.192
States along the eastern seaboard with aggressive decarbonization
goals are developing favorable renewable energy policies which promote
offshore wind development. Dominion Energy’s Coastal Virginia
Offshore Wind Project proposal to build a wind plant off the shore of
Virginia Beach, Virginia, could potentially power over 650,000 homes
during peak wind, and comes on the heels of the Governor’s 2018 Virginia
Energy Plan, which took an energetic stance towards accelerating OSW
development and production.193
The University of Maine’s Aqua Ventus project, a floating offshore
wind technology demonstration project, is a collaboration between the
University and New England Aqua Ventus, LLC (NEAV)—a joint venture
between offshore wind developers Diamond Offshore Wind and RWE
Renewables.194 The demonstration seeks to evaluate floating turbine
technology and gather environmental data on OSW interaction with the
marine environment and activities.195 Maine, a coastal state with plentiful
offshore wind resources, has aggressively developed policies
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favorable to renewable energy development.196 The demonstration is also
a chance to engage with the fishing industry, coastal communities, and
other interested parties on issues related to offshore wind development.197
For example, Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) can cause long
delays in the leasing and permitting process. Furthermore, pushback from
local coastal communities and maritime industries can halt a project in its
tracks. By involving the community early on, gathering relevant
environmental impact data, and developing lessons learned, Maine’s Aqua
Ventus project could be poised to streamline and shorten BOEM’s leasing
and permitting process, attracting investors and developers to future
commercial projects.
Projects like Vineyard Wind, off the coast of Martha’s Vineyard,
Massachusetts, which leased 160,000 acres from BOEM and expects to
generate enough energy to meet the power needs of the equivalent of
400,000 homes, was stalled when BOEM delayed its release of the EIS in
order to conduct additional studies.198 BOEM completed a supplement to
its draft EIS in mid-2020, with the permitting approval currently under
consideration.199 Delays in the NEPA process have pushed back the
project’s anticipated commercial date of 2022.200
While investors are warming up to the idea of large-scale OSW
farms, other interested parties are not as keen to place massive turbines off
the coast of the U.S. Despite these conflicts, the general trend is prooffshore wind development. In the coming decades, federal agencies, state
and local entities, developers, and special-interest groups will need to
work together to ensure that offshore wind projects move forward in an
economically, socially, and environmentally responsible way.
Furthermore, the federal and state commitment to renewable energy
196
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production, regulatory certainty, and investment into OSW technology
research and development, is essential if electricity produced by offshore
wind is going to be an economic competitor with other energy sources.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT COMPARISONS
Nuclear power is generally regarded as something to be feared, and
accidents like SL-1 in 1961 (SL-1 was an experimental U.S. Army reactor
which experienced a meltdown due to human error),201 the release of
radioactivity at Three Mile Island in 1979, the explosion at Chernobyl in
1986, and the containment breach at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in 2011
following multiple natural disasters, have done little to assuage the fears
of the public.202 Furthermore, the ongoing issue of developing a national
repository for SNF, significant construction and decommissioning costs
and cost overruns, and cheaper fuels like natural gas, have stifled nuclear
power plant construction in the last two-and-a-half decades.203 And in fact,
the U.S. has brought online only two new commercial nuclear reactors in
that time, the most recent being in 2016, with its sister reactor the next
newest in 1996.204
Offshore wind energy, on the other hand, promises clean energy (zero
GHG emissions and no liquid or solid waste), lower electricity prices, and
minimal-impact designs; and climate change goals continue to feed the
U.S. appetite for electricity generated from renewable sources like
wind.205 However, as the tale of Cape Wind demonstrates, the promise of
emissions-free energy did not prevent local groups from opposing the
201
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project to its demise.206 It begs the question of why there is such opposition
to a clean and reliable renewable energy source such as offshore wind? It
is possible that one of the answers lies in the importance placed on ocean
resources and habitats. Throughout history, humans have placed a very
high value on the ocean and the resources it provides.207 The oceans are a
source of wealth and a means to stay connected with the rest of the
world.208 A large portion of the world’s population relies on seafood as
the main sources of animal protein.209 Many coastal communities have
spiritual connections to the shores of their ancestors.210 These things have
proven to be no less important in the modern era, and as the demand for
ocean space for human activities increases, biodiversity decreases, and
marine resources are stressed to the max, the effective management of the
ocean’s resources is vital.211 Additionally, coastal economies prosper due
to waterfront properties and beaches with unfettered views of the ocean—
the high aesthetic value associated with the ocean.212 Lastly, as the
demand for ocean resources increases, the impacts of industry and human
activity on fragile ocean habitats has increased in kind, leading to a
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See Powell, supra note 184.
See Letter from the Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc Working Grp. of the Whole on the
Regular Process for Global Reporting and Assessment of the State of the Marine Env’t,
Including Socioeconomic Aspects to the President of the General Assembly, 3 (July 22,
2015), http://undocs.org/A/70/112 [hereinafter Working Grp. Letter] (discussing that
“one fifth of a cubic kilometre portion [of ocean] generates half of the annual production
of oxygen that each of us breathes, and all of the sea fish and other seafood that each of
us eats. It is the ultimate source of all the freshwater that each of us will drink in our
lifetimes”) [https://perma.cc/Q7N4-LRW5].
208
Id. (discussing the role of commercial shipping in transporting consumer goods for
sale and consumption, the seabed cables used for communication, and the riches of
minerals and oil and gas deposits found in and below the ocean seabed).
209
Id. at 11.
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See e.g., Powell, supra note 184, at 2026-2027 (discussing the Aquinnah Wampanoag
Tribe of Gay Head in Martha’s Vineyard, who alleged that Cape Wind’s development
would destroy their “historical, cultural, and spiritual resources” by obstructing their view
of the eastern horizon as part of their sunrise ceremonies and likely disrupting ancient
burial grounds).
211
See Working Grp. Letter, supra note 207, at 3-4.
212
Justin Good, The Aesthetics of Wind Energy, 13 HUMAN ECOLOGY REV. 76, 77 (2006),
http://www.humanecologyreview.org/pastissues/her131/good.pdf (discussing how local
opposition to Cape Wind’s offshore wind farm proposal were against what they saw as an
ugly, industrial obstruction to a beautiful landscape in a popular tourist area)
[https://perma.cc/6ARK-T22M].
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renewed consciousness about what activity we allow to take place in the
oceans of the world.213
Some organizations have taken measures to protect ocean wildlife
and habitats, which could hinder OSW development in certain areas. For
example, in late 2019, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
proposed designating almost 176,000 square nautical miles of the Pacific
Ocean as a critical habitat for three species of humpback whales.”214 This
area would cover a “mostly shoreline habitat” running from California to
Alaska.”215 The area’s designation as a critical habitat would require
federal agencies to ensure “that actions they authorize, fund, or carry out
are not likely to destroy or adversely modify that habitat.”216 While there
are some proposed exclusion areas for economic and military reasons, the
designation could effectively prohibit OSW development in the protected
area.217 OSW, among other activities, potentially impacts whales’ feeding
grounds by “prevent[ing] or imped[ing] the whales’ ability to access prey”
freely.218 However, the proposed rule acknowledged that the impact on
whales’ prey due to alternative energy activities “are speculative at this
time.”219 Additionally, certain areas may be excluded from critical habitat
designation if it is determined that the benefit gained by excluding the area
outweighs the benefit of designating the area as a critical habitat, so long
as the exclusion of the area will not result in the extinction of the
species.220 Therefore, it is also possible OSW development may be
determined to have a low or insignificant impact on whales’ feeding
213

See e.g., Working Grp. Letter, supra note 207, at 4 (discussing the World Summit on
Sustainable Development recommendation in 2002 that there be a “regular process for
global reporting and assessment of the state of marine environment, including
socioeconomic aspects”).
214

Proposed Rule to Designate Critical Habitat for the Central America, Mexico,
and Western North Pacific Distinct Population Segments of Humpback Whales,
84 Fed. Reg. 54354 (proposed Oct. 9, 2019) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223,
224, and 226), [hereinafter Proposed Rule]; Emily C. Dooley, Humpback Whale
Protections Proposed in Pacific Ocean, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 9, 2019),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com.
215

Dooley, supra note 214.
Proposed Rule, supra note 214, at 54354. This is a separate, but additional,
requirement from a federal agency’s requirement that their actions do not threaten the
existence of endangered species. Id.
217
Id. at 54382 (listing “alternative energy development” as a potentially impacted
activity due to the designation of the humpback whale critical habitat).
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Id. at 54362, 54382.
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Id. at 54382.
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Id. at 54378.
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grounds in the critical habitat areas, or certain offshore wind areas may be
assessed for exclusion from critical habitat designation under the benefits
balancing analysis.221
OSW farms require a large acreage of ocean space. Advances in
technology with the development of larger, more efficient, turbine blades,
may eventually decrease the area an offshore wind plant requires; but other
requirements such as spacing between turbines and offsets from other
structures also need to be taken into consideration. For example, the Cape
Wind project, estimated at producing 174 megawatts on average (utilizing
130 3.6-megawatt Siemans turbines mounted on monopile foundations)
and supplying seventy-five percent of Martha’s Vineyard’s, Cape Cod’s,
and Nantucket’s energy demands, would have covered a total footprint
(with a buffer zone) of forty-six square miles, not including the supporting
platforms and transmission lines to transmit electricity to shore.222 On the
scale of the ocean, that acreage might be insignificant, but as viewed from
the shore could potentially significantly disrupt a coastal community’s
aesthetic views or impede fishing activities and other uses of the coastal
zone.223
On the other hand, a typical commercial nuclear power plant
producing approximately 1000 megawatts can operate on a little over one
square mile.224 Taking into account the operating facilities in the U.S., that
means twenty percent of the U.S. electricity demand being met by nuclear
power takes up a little over seventy-five square miles.225 That is significant
land-savings for the amount of electricity produced. Furthermore, nuclear
power plants have an average capacity factor of about ninety percent (a
measure of how often a plant is online in a specified time),226 while
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The Proposed Rule solicited public commentary on alternative energy activities to
better inform the impact analysis; but, did not attempt to propose conservation
recommendations or estimate the cost of likely project modifications. Id. at 54375.
222
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 182.
223
See Powell, supra note 184, at 2026-2027; Good, supra note 212, at 77; Working Grp.
Letter, supra note 207, at 28-29 (discussing generally the increase in demand for ocean
space to conduct human activities such as tourism, aquaculture, shipping, oil and gas
drilling, etc.).
224

Land Needs for Wind, Solar Dwarf Nuclear Plant’s Footprint, NUCLEAR
ENERGY INST. (July 9, 2015), https://www.nei.org/news/2015/land-needs-forwind-solar-dwarf-nuclear-plants [https://perma.cc/47N8-329J].
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offshore wind farms have a capacity factor of about fifty percent.227 This
means that nuclear power is also more energy efficient per square mile.
However, this does not account for waste produced by nuclear power
generation, and estimates project that of the approximately 370,000
MTHM (metric tonnes of heavy metal) of waste produced by commercial
nuclear power in the world, slightly less than a third has been reprocessed
for other uses, while the balance is stored while it decays to safe levels
over the next thousands of years.228
These comparisons also do not take into account the underground
land mass required for spent nuclear fuel.229 Furthermore, nuclear power
plants utilizing cooling water from rivers, lakes, and oceans contribute to
thermal pollution in the form of hot water or steam discharges, which can
dangerously increase water temperatures and acerbate the effects of
already-existing chemical pollution.230 Another important comparison is
the environmental and public health cost of a radiological accident.
Rigorous safety controls minimize the potential for a nuclear accident, but
the health consequences of a nuclear accident dwarf those associated with
wind turbine failures.
Nuclear plants have greater siting flexibility than OSW plants,
meaning that they can potentially be less visible to the public (“out of
227

Offshore Wind Outlook 2019, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (2019),
https://www.iea.org/reports/offshore-wind-outlook-2019 (last visited Nov. 22, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/3AB4-RUZ5].
228
Radioactive Waste Management, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N., https://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-wastes/radioactive-wastemanagement.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4K8L-4HFN].
229

Deep geological storage is the globally-favored method of disposing of spent
nuclear fuel, and depending on the geology of the bedrock designated as a
potential site, and limited by the state of current mining and drilling technology,
could range from 250 meters to 1000 meters deep. Storage and Disposal of
Radioactive Waste, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N., https://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-waste/storage-anddisposal-of-radioactive-waste.aspx (last visited Nov. 28, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/YZ4W-B84L]. For example, Sweden’s proposed site would
utilize a combination of man-made and natural barriers to store spent nuclear
fuel in a repository approximately 500 meters into the bedrock. Id. Yucca
Mountain proposed to store spent nuclear fuel approximately 300 meters
underground, with the fuel housed in metal containers covered in titanium. Id.
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See C. E. Raptis et al., Global Thermal Pollution of Rivers from Thermoelectric
Power Plants, 11 ENV’T RESEARCH LETTERS 1 (Oct. 12, 2016),
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/11/10/104011/pdf (discussing that
thermal pollution from the “thermoelectric power sector,” which includes nuclear power,
is one of the leading causes of thermal pollution in freshwater sources)
[https://perma.cc/B5PT-4YWG].
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sight, out of mind”). OSW plants must be located within the constraints of
the natural landscape. While the northern states’ Atlantic shores, Southern
Atlantic, Great Lakes, and the Gulf of Mexico have robust wind resources,
their water depths vary greatly. For instance, off the Maine coast and
Pacific coast, a floating foundation is necessary;231 whereas for the rest of
the Atlantic coast, fixed-bottom turbines can be deployed by building them
into the seabed.232 Additionally, given the cost of running cables along the
seabed, OSW plants rely on the proximity of shore facilities and load
centers, and also the ability to build new infrastructure to support it.
In summary, a nuclear plant takes up minimal space in relation to its
power generation capacity and efficiency, while offshore wind plants take
up larger amounts of offshore acreage to produce comparable amounts of
electricity. But, comparing only generation capacity does not take into
account the added acreage and underground volume required to store SNF
after the life of the reactor—a volume that could not be utilized for any
other purpose during our collective lifetimes.
Despite the shared potential to reduce GHG emissions, both nuclear
and offshore wind have received a Not-In-My-Back-Yard (“NIMBY”)
response from some citizen groups.233 First, for nuclear power, a survey
series completed in 2015 found that nuclear power “plant neighbors”
largely favor nuclear power.234 The surveys determined that familiarity
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See David Thill, Why Floating Turbines are so Important to Maine’s Offshore Wind
Prospects, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Aug. 7, 2020),
https://energynews.us/2020/08/07/northeast/why-floating-turbines-are-so-important-tomaines-offshore-windprospects/#:~:text=The%20development%20keeps%20the%20New,for%20Maine's%20
deep%20ocean%20waters (discussing the necessity of offshore turbines in “Maine’s deep
ocean waters”) [https://perma.cc/Z4PL-HTU6]; Bobby Magill & Emily C. Dooley,
Floating Wind Farms for California Move a Step Closer to Reality, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct.
26, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/floating-wind-farmsfor-california-move-a-step-closer-to-reality-1 (discussing that California’s ocean floor is
too deep for anchored turbines) [https://perma.cc/V8F3-56LV].
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See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY & U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 131, at 31.
233
Peter D. Kinder, Not in My Backyard Phenomenon, BRITANNICA (June 14, 2016),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Not-in-My-Backyard-Phenomenon (NIMBY likely
first appeared in the 1970s in response to local opposition to developing nuclear power
facilities near neighborhoods) [https://perma.cc/QZA6-MJJG].
234
Ann S. Bisconti, NIMBY and Nuclear Energy, THE HILL (June 25, 2015, 8:36 AM),
https://thehill.com/sponsored/content/246018-nimby-and-nuclear-energy
[https://perma.cc/5TE4-C6NC]. The surveys were conducted from 2005-2015, and in the
most recent survey conducted in 2015, over one-thousand residents living near sixty
nuclear plant sites were polled. Id. The survey purposely excluded polling households
with nuclear plant workers. Id.
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was a key factor in public support for a local nuclear facility.235 Those
residents living in proximity to a nuclear power facility associated nuclear
power with reliable energy, efficiency, job creation, clean air, energy
security, and affordable electricity.236 Furthermore, plant neighbors gave
their local plant “high marks for safety and environmental protection.”237
NIMBY was once thought to be a barrier to nuclear power development,
but the results of the survey suggest that nuclear power has a “reverse
NIMBY” effect due to the small-scale nature of a nuclear plant compared
to its electricity generation potential.238 Meaning, that while a nuclear
facility generates enough electricity to power hundreds-of-thousands of
homes, its small plant footprint touches few communities directly. Thus,
while less than thirty-percent of the general public strongly favors nuclear
power (even though about seventy-percent of the general public is pronuclear energy utilization), nuclear facility developers only need the
support and approval of relatively few communities to construct and
operate a facility in their neighborhood.239 On the other hand, the build-up
of spent nuclear fuel without a designated permanent storage and disposal
site has modernized the NIMBY response to refer to residents who oppose
living near proposed nuclear waste storage sites.240
The NIMBY response has also been felt in the wind energy industry.
The failed Cape Wind project provides an example of how such opposition
can stop a project in its tracks.241 While opposition came from a local
Native American tribe and fisherman, the project also faced multiple
lawsuits backed by wealthy oceanfront property owners who opposed the
aesthetics of the OSW farm.242 Aesthetics can impact the success of an
OSW project proposal, even garnering local opposition from those
residents who support clean energy and wind power—as long as it is not
235

Id. (finding that eighty-three percent of nuclear power plant neighbors favor utilizing
nuclear energy as compared to sixty-eight percent of the general public).
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id. The survey found that almost fifty percent of plant neighbors strongly favored
nuclear power as compared to twenty-seven percent of the general public. Id.
240
See Katie Meehan, Lawmakers Must Overcome the “Not in My Backyard” Mentality
to Find a Site for the Nation’s Nuclear Waste, STATE LEGISLATURES MAG. (May 1, 2017),
https://www.ncsl.org/bookstore/state-legislatures-magazine/lawmakers-must-overcomenimby-mentality-when-storing-nuclear-waste.aspx [https://perma.cc/SYF3-CB5T].
241
See Ros Davidson, Cape Wind: Requiem for a dream, WINDPOWER MONTHLY (May 1,
2018), https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1462962/cape-wind-requiem-dream
[https://perma.cc/BH42-NSSY].
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installed where they can view it.243 Moving forward, OSW developers are
in a position to take the lessons learned from nuclear power, on-shore
wind, solar, and projects like Cape Wind, and engage with communities
early-on in a project’s lifetime to address local concerns.244 A national
survey conducted in March of 2020, showed across-the-board support for
offshore wind power.245 The idea that OSW is widely favored by the
general public, but locally opposed, shows that local residents who are
directly or indirectly impacted by an OSW farm will prioritize their local
interests (fishing, heritage, aesthetics, etc.) over the potential
environmental (and economic) benefits of an OSW farm. Therefore, by
understanding the concerns of the local communities, and addressing them
early-on in the proposal, offshore wind can possibly avoid the costly and
potentially catastrophic opposition to development.246
Environmental and social risks accompany any attempt to develop
an electric power generator, regardless of the energy source. Nuclear
power and wind power are similar to the degree that they produce
emissions-free energy. Both energy sources come with their share of
environmental concerns: nuclear power with its worst-case-scenario for
irreparable harm to the environment and public health in the event of an
accident, and the protracted issue surrounding the need for a permanent
repository for SNF; and OSW with its potential to disrupt endangered
habitats and species, and to disrupt migratory patterns and feeding grounds
of birds, mammals and other sea creatures. The coming decades predict no
decline in the world’s hunger for more power, or in the pressing need to
develop less carbon-intensive energy sources to curb global climate
change. Federal, state, and local governments will have to prioritize the
risks they are willing to take. Nuclear power risks environmental disaster,
but the probability of an accident is marginal; and, the “amount” of
emissions-free energy produced by nuclear power is not matched by any
other energy source currently utilized. Offshore wind power is also an
emissions-free energy, but we have yet to fully understand the long-term
243
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environmental consequences of large-scale offshore wind plants,
including burning fossil fuels to power the boats and barges that will be
required to maintain the turbines, and the potential disruption to delicate
habitats due to anchoring turbines and the related infrastructure required
to deliver wind-generated electricity to shore.
V. REGULATORY COMPARISONS
The electricity industry touches the lives of every human, plant, and
animal species on this planet. Whether the effect is felt directly—such as
the convenience of knowing that when you flick the switch the light will
come on, or indirectly—the vast and varied environmental impacts
inevitably intertwined with any source of electricity production. Energy
security (broadly referring to the adequate and uninterrupted supply of
electricity) is inherently intertwined with national security, and is therefore
a national interest.247
Nuclear energy is the poster child of a tightly regulated industry. In
the 1950s, Congress wasted little time in establishing an administrative
framework around which the new atomic energy industry would revolve.
At that time, the federal government had a pro-nuclear stance, and shortly
thereafter placed the task of developing the technology and facilities for
nuclear energy production in the hands of civilian developers with heavy
oversight from the federal government.248 Tax subsidies, research grants,
scholarships, and a favorable political climate all contributed to building a
robust nuclear power industry. When skepticism over the dual role of the
AEC in regulating and promoting nuclear energy came to a head, Congress
abolished the AEC with the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA),
separating the two function into the Energy Research and Development
Administration (ERDA), and an independent Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC).249 Certain research and development functions were
consolidated within the ERDA, while the NRC was given authority over
the licensing and regulatory functions of the commercial atomic energy
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See e.g., Stephen Eule, Energy a Key Part of New National Security Strategy, GLOBAL
ENERGY INST.: FUEL FOR THOUGHT (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://www.globalenergyinstitute.org/energy-key-part-new-national-security-strategy
(discussing that the current Administration’s national security policy included ensuring
energy security by protecting energy infrastructure) [https://perma.cc/KT8C-4XH2].
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42 U.S.C. § 5801; Fahring, supra note 89, at 289 (discussing concerns over potential
conflicts of interest whereby the AEC might sacrifice public safety in the name of nuclear
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industry.250 The NRC’s authority to regulate nuclear power production and
operation is near absolute. The NRC has rulemaking power, issues
guidance and develops industry standards, licenses plant operators,
oversees plant decommissioning and various aspects of SNF storage,
conducts safety inspections, assesses plant operations, conducts
investigations of wrongdoing and enforces regulations through sanctions
issued to licensees who violate NRC regulations, and performs an
adjudicatory function for affected parties.251 However, the “generation,
sale, or transmission of electrical power produced” by a nuclear facility
remains within the realm of other federal, state, or local entities, provided
those actions do not “regulate, control, or restrict any activities of the
[NRC].”252 Additionally, states have the authority to control uranium
mining operations on private land within their borders, with the NRC’s
regulatory authority beginning at the milling stage.253 State and local
entities also have a role in designating SNF storage locations and disposal
within their territory, and developing the safety measures related to that
storage and disposal. Finally, the AEA provides for cooperation between
the NRC and states, and allows agreements whereby the NRC can agree
to relinquish certain regulatory functions to the State.254
Centralized authority and relatively streamlined licensing do not
equate to simple or fast nuclear power facility construction and operation.
Applying for and receiving licenses, conducting necessary environmental
assessments, receiving design approval, addressing public concerns,
amassing the capital required to construct a nuclear facility, and ultimately
bringing a new commercial reactor online, takes years.255 The expenses
related to the construction and operation of a nuclear plant, and
competition in the electricity market from other energy sources like natural
250
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gas, means that nuclear power plants run the risk of being unprofitable to
build or operate absent subsidies or investment into technology that could
increase efficiency.256
Nuclear energy’s distant carbon-free cousin has not yet had greater
success bringing online power generation facilities that could
economically compete with conventional energy resources; although,
strides are being made in offshore wind technology such as floating turbine
technology, which could help offshore wind become a real competitor.
BOEM has regulatory authority over all offshore renewable energy
projects in federal waters pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and
30 C.F.R. § 585, and in that way performs roughly the same function as
atomic energy’s NRC. Similar to commercial nuclear energy developers,
offshore wind developers must apply for leases and permits with BOEM.
BOEM is involved at every stage of the leasing process, and—comparable
to the NRC—coordinates and conducts the required environmental
assessments. While the regulatory structures of the two organizations have
similarities, BOEM faces a different set of challenges. The offshore wind
energy industry is a relatively “new” sector of the renewable energy
industry. BOEM has been in existence and performing its functions for
only about a decade; and like most new areas of administration, it takes
time, trial, and error to develop efficient and effective policies and
regulations.
The Cape Wind project stands as a testament to the lengthy timelines
of OSW leasing. Cape Wind first applied to build an OSW facility with
the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) in 2001.257 When the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 vested regulatory authority in the DOI, Cape Wind
subsequently applied for a commercial lease from the Minerals
Management Service (subsequently renamed the BOEM) later that year.258
The draft EIS for the facility began in 2004, with the final EIS was
published in the beginning of 2009.259 Due to local opposition, revisions
to the COP, and lease extension requests, the project effectively stalled
256
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and was ultimately abandoned in 2018.260 In contrast, the Block Island
Wind Farm, which began commercial service in late 2016, took
considerably less time from design inception to operation (approximately
seven years).261 While many factors must be considered when analyzing
why one project flourishes while another flounders, the Block Island Wind
Farm had the advantages of being small, applying for permitting and
licensing after the shift of regulatory authority from the USACE to the
DOI, in a more pro-renewable climate, with less local opposition, and with
the lessons-learned from Cape Wind behind it.262 Another example is
Vineyard Wind, which is suffering from delays related to its
environmental review process.263 In addition to delays due to local
opposition, federal regulators recently determined that Vineyard Wind’s
EIS would be evaluated by examining the cumulative impacts of all
planned OSW development on the Atlantic coast.264
While there may be valid comparisons to draw between the
permitting, construction, and operational timelines of nuclear and offshore
wind facilities, the sheer number of variables that may affect anticipated
project completion timelines makes it almost moot. What can be
concluded is that from its outset, Congress made it abundantly clear that
the NRC was and is the chief authority in regulating nuclear matters in the
U.S. The lines of jurisdiction were blurred only at the very beginning and
end of the nuclear life-cycle, and have largely been drawn in subsequent
litigation. And although the process of permitting, licensing, and
constructing a nuclear power facility is extremely involved, the NRC has
had over sixty years to collect lessons-learned, refine and streamline its
licensing processes, rulemaking, and other regulatory functions. The NRC
is essentially a full-service, one-stop-shop for commercial nuclear power
developers.
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On the other hand, offshore wind has new and novel issues that must
be considered in the permitting and leasing process.265 BOEM faces
challenges from multiple interested parties—other federal agencies, state
agencies, tribes, and local citizen groups. BOEM may be disadvantaged in
that OSW farms impact a greater number of communities than a nuclear
power facility—i.e., disadvantaged in the fact that BOEM must essentially
receive more support from more locales, and more diverse approvals from
multiple jurisdictions to move forward successfully on a project.266 Public
support (gained through public engagement) is critical to a project’s
viability since public opposition can stall or put the kibosh on a project,
and can potentially sway state and federal policy attitudes towards
OSW.267 BOEM’s A Citizen’s Guide to the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management’s Renewable Energy Authorization Process indicates that for
both the competitive leasing and non-competitive leasing process: (1) a
public comment period is available at almost every phase of the process,
and (2) public meetings are held at the NEPA review stage.268 BOEM also
posts public engagement opportunities on its website.269 As part of the
NEPA review, BOEM solicits input from the public on a variety of issues
important to the public in a process called scoping.270 At first glance, it
appears that BOEM has a robust public outreach program, comparable to

265

For example, pushback from local residents because of the aesthetic value placed on
unobstructed ocean views.
266
See Bisconti, supra note 234.
267
See generally Casey, supra note 244 (explaining that “community engagement
matters not just for project permitting but also for building local support that translates to
real clout with state and federal policy makers in the years ahead”).
268
BUREAU OF OCEAN MGMT., A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY
MANAGEMENT’S RENEWABLE ENERGY AUTHORIZATION PROCESS 6-9 (2016),
https://www.boem.gov/sites/default/files/renewable-energy-program/KW-CG-Broch.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TG62-ZDGK]. BOEM solicits public comment by publishing notices in
the Federal Register at various stages in a projects development. Id. at 15.
269
Public Engagement, BUREAU OF OCEAN MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/publicengagement (last visited Nov. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/W52X-H2VL]. BOEM’s
website states that methods of public engagement include “accepting public comments
online,” “interact[ing] with stakeholders and partners in state, local and tribe
governments through task force meetings and small community meetings on specific
issues,” and publications. Id.
270
BUREAU OF OCEAN MGMT., supra note 268, at 16 (including archaeological/cultural
sites, fisheries, historic properties, migratory species, Native American Interests,
navigation/maritime commerce, protected species, sensitive offshore habitats,
socioeconomic issues and environmental justice, recreation and tourism, viewshed,
aviation, and national security).
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the NRC’s.271 Yet, despite the numerous opportunities for public
commentary (assuming that the public is utilizing the channels provide to
voice concerns about OSW), offshore wind projects are being delayed or
outright failing because of local opposition.272 In other words, an effective
public engagement program should be able to relieve local concerns early
and expeditiously so that local opposition does not hinder project
completion. The answers of why BOEM has continued to struggle to gain
local support through its public engagement, especially when surveys
show widespread support for utilizing offshore wind, could be due to a
few factors. First, offshore wind is a new energy sector, and the public is
generally skeptical of the unknown and untested.273 Second, the large area
offshore wind projects require impacts multiple jurisdictions, meaning that
defeat in one jurisdiction due to public opposition can terminate the entire
project.274 Third, offshore wind is just that, offshore. The ocean’s vast
resources, habitats, and wildlife are under the control or protection of too
many interested parties. It is sufficing to say that an offshore wind
developer is unlikely to alleviate the concerns of, or the burden on, all
those in opposition.275 Fourth, because of the environmental benefits
271

The NRC provides numerous opportunities for public commentary and public
involvement in hearings, rulemaking, licensing, and enforcement proceedings. Public
Meetings and Involvement, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N,
https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/UX2S-S5D8].
272
For example, Cape Wind, and more recently Vineyard Wind, which is facing
continuing opposition because of its potential impacts on commercial fisheries and
endangered North Atlantic right whales. Samantha Gross, Renewable, Land Use, and
Local Opposition in the United States, FOREIGN POL’Y AT BROOKINGS 1, 13 (2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/FP_20200113_renewables_land_use_local_
opposition_gross.pdf [https://perma.cc/3S4H-7KPR].
273
See generally Casey, supra note 244 (“new sectors require[] a much greater
commitment to public affairs and external communications right from the start in order to
forge a place within an established industry”).
274
As opposed to a nuclear power plant, which directly impacts a much smaller
community, and requires approval from a smaller local population. Bisconti, supra note
234.
275
Limitations in offshore wind technology might play a part as well. For example,
offshore wind turbines have height, spacing, location, orientation, and connection
requirements. These requirements are not necessarily flexible in the sense that they are
fixed depending on the project and its location. In other words, if the wind currents are
coming from a certain direction—a fact out of human control—it may set the location
and orientation of the turbines. Another example is the size of the turbine required to
harness offshore wind energy, which in turn dictates turbine spacing. See Gross, supra
note 272 at 9-14.
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associated with renewable energy, developers might make premature
assumptions about the public acceptance of a proposed project, neglecting
to fully engage with the interested community on its concerns.276 Lastly,
when it comes to citizens’ priorities, protecting their communities from
the perceived downfalls of OSW could outweigh any real environmental
or economic benefits stemming from the project.277
BOEM has established Intergovernmental Task Forces (made up
solely of government entities) in fourteen states.278 The Task Force is
BOEM’s “primary mechanism for coordinating with governmental
partners.”279 BOEM’s other major mechanism to coordinate with state and
federal agencies is through developing Memoranda of Understanding
(MOUs), which “describe[e] each agency’s roles for reviewing renewable
energy projects on the OCS.”280 While these mechanisms are in place to
help streamline the permitting and licensing process, it could still take up
to ten years for a commercial offshore wind farm to come online, and the
developer receives only a twenty-five year permit.281 Additionally,
offshore wind developers face the challenges associated with creating an
offshore grid and tying it in to existing on-shore grids.
Thus, even if BOEM faces little public opposition (or at the very least
adequately addresses the concerns of various groups), and the
Intergovernmental Task Force and MOUs effectively streamline the
licensing and permitting process for a new offshore wind farm, the process
still could take approximately ten years (from inception to operation).
Moreover, the developer receives only a twenty-five-year permit (with the
possibility of renewal), and still faces immense uncertainty associated with
276

See id. at 14 (discussing the fact that renewable energy developers sometimes assume
community support is automatic).
277
But see, e.g., id. at 13 (discussing that although negative tourism and fishing impacts
were associated with the Block Island Wind Farm, preliminary data shows an actual
increase in tourism due to, perhaps, curiosity about the wind farm). Also, the submerged
part of the turbines acts as artificial reefs and are attracting more wildlife to the area. Id.
278
BUREAU OF OCEAN MGMT., supra note 268, at 15.
279
Id. at 15 (stating that the Intergovernmental Task Force is comprised of federally
recognized tribes, federal agencies, state, and local governments, and that the Task Force
is involved at every phase).
280
Id. at 18 (listing the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S.
Department of Defense, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service).
281
BUREAU OF OCEAN MGMT., REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND GUIDELINES,
https://www.boem.gov/renewable-energy/regulatory-framework-and-guidelines (last
visited Nov. 23, 2020) [https://perma.cc/C5QP-5FR2]. Nuclear power plants can take a
similar amount of time to construct and begin operation, but receive a forty-year vice
twenty-five-year license.
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cost-effectively generating and transmitting electricity to the on-shore
grid.282 Besides the small (thirty-megawatt) Block Island Wind Farm
(which took approximately seven years to bring online), the ten-year
timeline has not proven to be a reality for offshore wind projects.
Neither of the regulatory frameworks for nuclear energy or wind
energy have demonstrated an effective and efficient path to commercial
power operation. Both energy sector’s projects have been subject to
extreme delays, termination, or gross cost overruns. For nuclear power this
is true despite the fact that the NRC is essentially a one-stop-shop, and
given great latitude in reviewing and approving design and construction
plans. On the other hand, the regulatory landscape of offshore wind is
more spread out, with BOEM at the helm, but required to rely on the
consultation with and approvals of multiple state and federal agencies
through the Intergovernmental Task Force or NEPA Process. Centralizing
greater authority in BOEM “for all things offshore wind” may help
streamline the leasing and permitting process, decreasing the costs
associated with developing an OSW project. But, two of the biggest
contributors to OSW project delays appear to be public opposition to the
project (and BOEM’s inability to fully allay those fears and move
forward), and the delays in the NEPA review process. Furthermore,
nuclear power, with all its centralized authority, has struggled to construct
and bring online new reactors in the last two-and-a-half decades because
of delays, construction timelines, and related cost overruns.283 Thus, it may
be that, in addition to centralizing BOEM’s authority, strengthening
BOEM’s public engagement at critical phases in the OSW project’s
development, while also stabilizing and greatly streamlining its regulatory
landscape, would have the effect of making a more efficient and
expeditious permitting and leasing process.284 To that end, BOEM could
utilize its Intergovernmental Task Force to facilitate early engagement
between OSW developers and local communities to address local
concerns.

282

See e.g., Gross, supra note 272 at 11 (discussing that the transmission infrastructure
required to connect renewable sources to the grid are costly and risk the financial
viability of renewable projects. But, also that investment into renewable energy is
“needed to justify construction of new transmission.”).
283
See e.g., Mooney, supra note 113 (discussing the only two new nuclear reactors
brought online since 1996).
284
This idea is supported by nuclear power’s early success, largely due to favorable
policy driven by “widespread popular support.” Fahring, supra note 89, at 287-88.
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is premature to conclude that policymakers and energy sector
developers have an altruistic view of protecting the environment and
public health from the dangers of electricity production. The histories of
nuclear and wind energy unveil the naivety of that sentiment. Nuclear
energy is a zero-emissions power source, and its capacity and generation
potential are completely unmatched by any other resource on earth. It is
arguably the only energy source that could effectively curb the changing
climate if we refuse to make drastic changes such as decreasing our overall
energy consumption. But nuclear energy faces many other roadblocks to
its development, one of the biggest being how and where to store SNF,
with others being national security concerns, fears about radiological
accidents, and the incredible expense involved in constructing and
operating a nuclear facility. Without extensive subsidies, nuclear power
struggles to remain profitable enough to be a serious player in the
electricity market. On the other hand, wind resources are arguably free.285
OSW plants also produce emissions-free electricity, and even come
without the added concerns of waste discharges. At a conceptual level,
OSW is an economic, social, and environmental win-win. Still, the
offshore wind industry faces its own set of challenges, including public
opposition to utilizing local coastal zones, and uncertainties in the
profitability of generating electricity using a resource whose consistency
can only be estimated, not controlled. The costs associated with leasing,
designing, and constructing offshore wind plants, combined with the
added expense of building the necessary offshore and onshore support
infrastructure, and the fact that offshore wind’s electrical generation
capacity is small compared to that of fossil fuels and nuclear, means that
offshore wind cannot economically compete in the electricity market, yet.
It seems that it is not enough that habitats are being destroyed, species
are going extinct, and sea levels are dangerously rising. Consumers
demand more electricity at low prices, and state utility companies tightly
control their territory’s electrical grids and energy markets. Without some
certainty of profitability, commercial developers will not invest in lowcarbon electricity generators. In the same vein, developers will not get into
the business of renewable or sustainable energy without regulatory
certainty. Low-carbon energy sources are ripe for development and
utilization. But without a stable regulatory framework and nation-wide
(and local) public support, commercial production of renewable and
285

There are complex issues surrounding the ownership of wind resources that are
beyond the scope of this article.
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sustainable energy will remain a dream for the future—a future that may
come too late.
Nuclear energy’s “glory days” do not need to be a thing of the past,
but if the U.S. is to see a revival of the nuclear power industry, there are
keys areas that need to be addressed including designating a national
repository for spent nuclear fuel, decreasing nuclear plant construction
costs and timeline, and a renewed commitment from policymakers to
promote nuclear power as a carbon-free energy source.286 Offshore wind,
poised to provide long-term emissions-free electricity in the carbonsaturated world, must stay relevant-i.e., economically viable, and publicly
in favor. It cannot afford to be bogged down by unstable regulation or
ineffective public engagement. If the U.S. is going to rely on offshore wind
as a method to combat climate change, it needs to make significant
investment into wind research and technology, increase economic
certainty, and develop an efficient regulatory structure.
When it comes to suffering the impacts of climate change, we may
be past the point of no return, or we may still have time to revamp and
revise how we do business in the U.S. when it comes to regulating
renewable energy development. The U.S. should be taking a hard look at
its policies and reviewing acts such as NEPA for outdatedness and
irrelevancy, tailoring legislation to help push renewable energy projects
through in an efficient and responsible manner, and developing a
regulatory structure within agencies like BOEM that would give them a
more “soup-to-nuts” type of authority in permitting and leasing renewable
energy facilities. BOEM should review its public engagement policy and
program for effectiveness, and utilize its Intergovernmental Task Force to
connect with the communities the Task Force serves. Efforts like these
could ultimately assist in accelerating clean energy efforts, curbing the
effects of GHG-induced climate change, and changing the course of our
harsh reality.
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See Silverstein, supra note 113 (discussing that a “price on carbon” by policymakers
could help nuclear power’s financial struggles, and that a central question for
policymakers is whether nuclear energy is part of the “Green New Deal”); Mooney,
supra note 113 (discussing that nuclear power is not “valued properly” due to the fact
that there is not a price on carbon”).

